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omy by around 6% after 15 years, leaving average income per capita, income
inequality, and poverty roughly unchanged. The dependency ratio is not
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on the degree of heterogeneity and clustering of the HIV/AIDS-infections
over the population.
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Since the eighties HIV/AIDS2 has spread very rapidly in Sub-saharan Africa.
Today there are countries as Botswana, South-Africa and Zimbabwe where
more than 20% of the adult population is infected. Cˆ ote d’Ivoire is the
West-African country most aﬀected by the AIDS epidemic and one of the
15 most aﬀected countries in the world. The ﬁrst two AIDS cases in Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire were declared at the end of 1985 (Garenne, Madison, Tarantola et al.
1995). Afterwards the epidemic spread very rapidly and end-2001 UNAIDS
estimated the adult prevalence rate at 9.7 percent,3 the number of adults
and children who died of AIDS in that year at 75,000, and the number of
current living AIDS-orphans at 420,000 (UNAIDS/WHO 2002). The Institut
National de la Statistique of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire calculated on the basis of the
population census of 1998 a life expectancy at birth for men and women
of 49.2 and 52.7 years respectively. Today, UNAIDS estimates that these
indicators have fallen to 47.7 and 48.1 years. Whereas without AIDS the
life expectancy for men and women would have been expected to increase to
61 and 65 years in 2015, they are now expected to be 15% and 18% below
(United Nations 2001).
AIDS epidemic has a signiﬁcant demographic impact by increasing sharply
mortality for young adults and thus modifying signiﬁcantly the population
age structure (e.g. UNAIDS/WHO 1991; Brouard 1994; United Nations
1999). But AIDS has probably also a strong economic impact. Up to now,
micro-economic studies are, with a few exceptions, restricted to a listing of
2In what follows we will refer to “HIV/AIDS” only by “AIDS”.
3This estimation includes all adults (15 to 49 years), with HIV infection, whether or
not they have developed symptoms of AIDS, alive at the end of 1999. In 1998, HIV1
seroprevalence ranged from 8 to 13 percent among pregnant women in ten cities, while
HIV2 infection remained low at 1 percent or below (International Program Center 2000).
1potential eﬀects on households’ welfare or enterprises eﬃciency4 or are often
based on unrepresentative case studies.5 Macroeconomic consequences on
growth have already been studied for several countries, either by single/cross-
country regressions,6 macro-projections7 or Computable General Equilibrium
Models.8 Five main channels have been often cited by which the AIDS epi-
demic may aﬀect the growth and the distribution of income: (i) the changes
in the level and in the composition of labor supply including the destruction
of accumulated human capital (education, work experience), (ii) the slow-
down in the accumulation of new human capital (iii) the negative impact
of illness on the productivity of labor, (iv) the negative impact of increased
private and public health expenditures on savings and investment and on
the long-term demand for labor, (v) the disorganisation of enterprises and
administrations. We focus here on the ﬁrst channel, i.e. labor supply and hu-
man capital destruction issues, by studying the counterfactual consequences
of the over-mortality caused by the AIDS epidemics on the micro-economic
distribution of income.
For this purpose, we apply a dynamic demo-economic micro-simulation
model able to simulate over a ﬁfteen years period the impact of AIDS on
the demographic structure of the population and on household and invidual
incomes. This model is implemented using a rich set of micro-demographic
and micro-economic surveys on Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. More precisely, we embed a
4See e.g. Philipson and Posner (1995), UNAIDS/WHO (1999), ILO (2000).
5See e.g. Barnett and Blackie (1989), Tibaijuka (1997), B´ echu(1998), Janjaroen (1998),
Menon, Wawer, Konde-Lule et al. (1998), Kamuzora and Gwalema (1998), Aventin and
Huard (2000), Gregson, Waddell and Chandiwana (2001), Booysen and Bachmann (2002).
6See e.g. Bloom and Mahal (1995), Bonnel (2000), McPherson, Hoover and Snodgrass
(2000), Dixon, McDonald and Roberts (2001).
7See e.g. Becker (1990); Cuddington (1993a, 1993b), Cuddington and Hancock (1994),
Cuddington, Hancock and Rogers (1994), Haacker (2002), Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach
(2003).
8See e.g. Kambou, Devarajan and Over (1994), Arndt and Lewis (2000, 2001), Mac-
Farlan and Sgherri (2001).
2structural micro-economic household income model in a demographic dy-
namic micro-simulation model built in the spirit of the models used in indus-
trialized countries to analyze pension reforms, the distribution of life-cycle
incomes, or the accumulation of wealth (see e.g. Harding 2000). The demo-
graphic part of our model simulates the most important demographic events
as fertility, mortality, marriage, household formation, and migration. It is
based on data from several household income surveys, a Demographic and
Health Survey, a migration survey, and a population census, all undertaken
during the nineties in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, as well as on demographic projections
by the United Nations. Our study is the ﬁrst which applies such techniques
to an African country. Another originality of our study is that we account
explicitly for heterogeneity and clustering in the individual probability of get-
ting AIDS. In contrast with Wachter, Knodel and VanLandingham (2003),
who couple empirically based region-speciﬁc risk multipliers with random
household-speciﬁc risk multipliers, we draw from a Demographic and Health
Survey to construct risk multipliers which are explained by individual socio-
economic characteristics. This allows us to link directly the probability of
dying from AIDS to the main observable correlates of individual incomes.
Finally, our study is the ﬁrst attempt to link the distribution of AIDS over
the population to the distribution of income.
Not much is known about the distribution of the AIDS epidemic in African
countries. Again today, prevalence rates of the HIV virus and mortality at-
tributable to AIDS illness are only roughly estimated at the national/regional
level.9 The hypothetical approach followed here can not replace direct infor-
mation that could be collected on the ﬁeld through representative surveys
9For Uganda, the extent of the decline of the prevalence rate was recently put into
question (see Parkhurst 2002 and The Economist, August 17th-23rd 2002, pp. 32-33).
3with seroprevalence testing.10 It can not replace either epidemiological mod-
eling or micro-analysis of risky behaviors. But we think it is the best suited
solution to derive from the existing epidemiological information a prospective
image of the distribution of the AIDS epidemic, and to confront this distri-
bution with the distribution of income. In the context of poverty reduction
strategies, it may help to identify more precisely the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of target groups (orphans, young mothers etc.) and shed light on
some policy dilemmas (prevention vs. care, large coverage care vs. extension
of Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapies (HAART)).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our micro-
simulation model. In Section 3, we present the results of the three coun-
terfactuals that are simulated, a “without AIDS” scenario and two “with
AIDS” scenarios. We ﬁrst discuss them in terms of growth, inequality and
poverty changes since the early 1990s up to 2007, and then analyze the im-
pact of AIDS on individual welfare trajectories. Section 4 draws some policy
implications and concludes.
2M o d e l s t r u c t u r e
2.1 Key characteristics of the model
We use a dynamic micro-simulation model designed to simulate at the indi-
vidual level the most important demographic and economic events through
time. The micro-simulation approach allows us to take into account individ-
ual heterogeneity, in particular regarding the risk of AIDS infection and the
income earning capacity. Furthermore, it permits to analyze the policy out-
comes in terms of inequality and poverty, and not only in terms of growth, as
does an aggregated model. The dynamic approach is important because the
10The ﬁrst survey of this kind has just been conducted in South Africa (HSRC 2002).
4AIDS epidemic, although it strongly modiﬁes the age mortality rates, only
has a signiﬁcant impact on the age structure in the long term. In the mean-
time the mortality change interacts with other demographic and economic
behaviors such as fertility, marriage and labor supply. The basic unit is the
individual, but each individual belongs in each period to a speciﬁc household.
The model is a discrete time model, in which each period corresponds to one
year. We model and simulate the following events: marriage, household for-
mation, school enrolment, fertility, mortality, international immigration, oc-
cupational choices, generation of individual earnings and household income.
The starting population is constructed using the Enquˆ ete Prioritaire (called
“EP 1993”hereafter) which was carried out by the Institut National de la
Statistique of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire (INS) and the World Bank in 1992 and 1993.
The survey contains information about the socio-demographic characteris-
tics of household members, their housing, health (but not AIDS infection),
education, employment, agricultural- and non-agricultural enterprises, earn-
ings, expenditures, and assets. From March to June 1992, 1,680 households
in Abidjan (economic capital of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire), and from June to November
1993 7,920 households (among them 3,360 in other Ivorian cities) from the
rest of the country were interviewed. The total sample covers 58,014 indi-
viduals. The sample was adjusted such that the common starting point for
all households is January 1st 1993. In what follows, we brieﬂy present the
modelling of mortality, and in particular mortality due to AIDS infection,
and that of earnings which constitute the fundamental parts of our model.
The modelling of the other behaviors and events is presented shortly in the
Appendix.11
11It should be emphasized that in lack of longitudinal data, most regressions used are
based on information derived from cross-section data. When using these regressions to
simulate dynamic behaviour, we must of course make the strong assumption that individ-
uals behave over time as individuals of diﬀerent ages observed in the base year. The most
52.2 Mortality and the risk of AIDS infection
We perform two kinds of AIDS simulations. The ﬁrst one, that we call
WAIDSU—for With AIDS and Uniform—simply relies on United Nations’
mortality projections, where the risk of dying of AIDS in each year only varies
with sex and age. The second one, that we call WAIDSH—for With AIDS and
Heterogenous—accounts for heterogeneity and clustering in the individual
probability of getting AIDS within each sex and age group. The individual
risk factors are derived from variables on attitudes regarding AIDS collected
for men (15 to 59 years old) and women (15 to 49 years old) in the Ivorian
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 1994 (INS 1995a). These risk
factors are then calibrated on United Nations’ mortality projections. This
section brieﬂy describes the construction of our so-called WAIDSH scenario.
A more detailed description of this method can be found in Cogneau and
Grimm (2003).
At the individual level we suppose that the probability of infection de-
pends on the number of partners, the frequency of unprotected sexual in-
tercourse with each partner, and the average level of infection of chosen
partners. Drawing from the “susceptible-infected” (SI) model of Anderson
and May (1992), adopted by Kremer (1996), we write:
P = ρβY (1)
where P is the individual probability of becoming infected over a given pe-
riod, ρ is the number of partners during this period, β the transmission rate,
and Y the average prevalence rate of partners. The Ivorian DHS gives us
at least for men a good proxy for ρ that is the declared number of sexual
partners in the last two months. For women this variable is not available,
critical in doing this is that with cross-section data we cannot separate age, period, and
cohort eﬀects.
6therefore we simply use the dichotomous information on whether the woman
had a sexual intercourse in the preceding two months. To measure β,w eu s e
the information regarding the frequency of condom use, assuming implicitly
a constant frequency of sexual intercourse with each partner. Y is approxi-
mated by the variable “knowing somebody with AIDS”, supposing that this
gives a clue about the level of infection of the social network surrounding the
individual. This is of course a very extreme assumption as knowing some-
body with AIDS may also reﬂect individual social capital and may induce
more cautious sexual behavior (see below).
In order to obtain a predictor for P for our simulation model, each of
these three variables is regressed, separately for men and women, on a vector
of observed variables containing age, education, region of residence, matri-
monial status, household size, and the individual relation to the household
head. In the equations of β and Y , we also introduce the declared number
of sexual partners in the last two months (having had sexual intercourse in
the preceding two months for women) in order to control for the impact of
sexual activity on these variables. Then, when using the estimated equations
to predict individual risks, we ignore the corresponding parameters to ob-
tain a “per partner” measure. For the men’s ρ,w ec h o o s ea no r d e r e dp r o b i t
speciﬁcation. For all other equations,w eu s eas i m p l eb i n a r yp r o b i tm o d e l .
The so constructed model suggests that the predicted individual risk of
infection P and thus the risk of dying through AIDS increases with educa-
tional attainment. This is consistent with empirical evidence summarized by
Hargreaves and Glynn (2002) and with the results of the ﬁrst representative
household survey with HIV testing undertaken in South Africa.12 The driv-
12In this survey, HIV prevalence signiﬁcantly and monotonically increases with educa-
tional attainment among African adults, i.e. going from 8.7 percent for those with no
schooling to 21.1 percent for those who have completed high school (HSCR 2002).
7ing forces behind this relation are that educated people are more likely to
have several sexual partners and that they act in a more risky social net-
work. In that sense the Y component reinforces the correlation between the
risk factor and education implying that our “heterogenous” scenario called
“WAIDSH” constitutes a kind of maximum benchmark through which we try
to assess the importance of heterogenous risk factors for the economic impact
of the AIDS epidemic. Important factors linked to education may be higher
income and social status, personal autonomy, spatial mobility, and polygamy.
However, the positive correlation between risk of infection and education is
partly oﬀset by a higher probability of condom use among educated peo-
ple. Some argue that these excess infection levels seen among more educated
groups may disappear as the epidemic progresses, because educated people
may adopt new, less risky lifestyles quicker than other groups (Ainsworth
and Semali 1998; Gregson, Waddell and Chandiwana 2001; de Walque 2002;
Hargreaves and Glynn 2002). We checked this hypothesis by running the
same regressions on the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 1998/99.
We found very similar regression coeﬃcients to 1994, especially the measured
associations between risk and education hold. We based our analysis on the
DHS 1994, because the DHS 1998/99 has a much smaller sample size (3,040
women and 886 men vs. 8,099 and 2,552 respectively) and seems biased to-
ward urban areas (Macro International Inc. 1999). Furthermore, the model
implies that the predicted infection risk for men is higher in rural areas for
the age groups 15 to 39, whereas it is lower for the age groups 40 to 54. For
women, they are in the early stage of the epidemic always higher in rural
areas, but as the overall level of infection increases, they are slightly higher
in urban areas for all age groups older than 25. It might seem surprising
that the AIDS death probabilities are not signiﬁcantly lower in rural areas
8than in urban areas, but one should note that levels of HIV seroprevalence
among pregnant women are in fact not very diﬀerent between Abidjan and
the other nine cities where pre-natal detection is conducted (International
Program Center 2000). These tests probably exclude pregnant women in
remote rural areas; nevertheless, according to the Ivorian DHS of 1994, more
than 80 percent of pregnant women attend a pre-natal examination.
The predicted individual risk factors P are then calibrated on dynamic
mortality tables for men and women, supposing implicitly that the risk of
dying through AIDS is proportional to the risk of infection. These mortality
tables are computed using (i) the Ivorian United Nations’ projections (United
Nations 2001) for infant mortality, juvenile mortality and life expectancy at
birth for the period 1990 to 2010 (see Table 1) and (ii) Ledermann model life
tables (Ledermann 1969). The United Nations’ projections include a with
AIDS and a without AIDS scenario allowing to disaggregate the mortality
tables in AIDS deaths and deaths due to other causes. AIDS mortality is
introduced in our mortality tables in such a way that it concerns only children
up to ﬁve years and adults between 20 and 59 years old. The individual
AIDS risk factors are, of course, only applied to the mortality due to AIDS.
Because of lack of data for women older than 49 years in the Ivorian DHS, we
introduce no risk heterogeneity for that age group. For children under ﬁve,
we apply the risk factor of the mother. In households where an AIDS death
occurred, the Y variable is set to one to reﬂect intra-household transmission of
AIDS. It is important to note that the resulting AIDS mortality probabilities
for population subgroups are not independent of the population structure.
During the simulation, we update in each period the individual risk factors,
calibrate them in order to respect the United Nations’ projections and then
simulate AIDS and non-AIDS deaths using a Monte Carlo lottery.
9[please insert Table 1 about here]
As Table 1 shows the risk of dying through AIDS increases signiﬁcantly
in the 1990s. For instance, in the year 2000 our model implies that for men
and women between 20 to 45 years old the risk of dying through AIDS is
equal or sometimes even higher (especially for women) than that of dying by
another cause than AIDS. Thus, AIDS becomes for these age groups by far
the major cause of death.
If the household head dies, this position is given to another household
member according to her/his relation to the former household head and
her/his age.
2.3 Occupational choice and labor income model
2.3.1 Theoretical framework: a weakly competitive labor market
model
The labor income model draws from Roy’s model (1951) as formalized by
Heckman and Sedlacek (1986) and Magnac (2001). It is competitive in the
sense that no segmentation or job rationing prevails. But it is only weakly
competitive because labor mobility across sectors does not equalize returns
to observed and unobserved individual characteristics. In each period, each
individual belongs to a given family or household whose composition and
location is exogenously determined. We assume that each individual older
than eleven years and out of school faces three kinds of work opportunities:
(i) family work, (ii) self-employment, (ii) wage work. Family work includes
all kinds of activities under the supervision of the household head, that is
family help in agricultural or informal activities, but also domestic work,
non-market labor and various forms of declared “inactivity”. Self-employed
work corresponds to informal independent activities. In agricultural house-
10holds, the household head is considered as a permanent farmer bound to the
available land or cattle.Wage work includes all other kinds of workers, from
agricultural or informal wage workers to civil servants or workers in large
formal ﬁrms.
To self-employed work and wage-work we associate two potential earnings
functions:
lnw1i =l np1 + X1iβ1 + t1i (2)
lnw2i =l np2 + X2iβ2 + t2i (3)
where for each individual i and for each labor market segment j =1 ,2,w ji
are the individual potential earnings, Xji are observable individual charac-
teristics (human capital, region of residence, sex, nationality), tji are sector-
speciﬁc unobservable individual productive abilities, and pj is the price paid
for each eﬃciency unit of labor.
To family work, we associate an unobserved individual value that depends
also on household characteristics and on other members’ labor decisions:
ln  w0i =( X0i,Z 0h)β0 +  t0i (4)
where for each each individual i pertaining to household h, Z0h summarizes
invariant household characteristics and other members decisions which inﬂu-
ence labor market participation.
To agricultural households, we associate a reduced farm proﬁt function
derived from a Cobb-Douglas technology:
lnΠ0h =l np0 + αlnLh + Zhθ + u0h (5)
where p0 is the price of the agricultural good, Lh the total amount of la-
bor used for agricultural activity, Zh other household characteristics like cul-
tivable land, and u0h stands for the unobservable idiosyncratic factors’ global
productivity.
11For non-agricultural household members,  w0 may be seen as a pure reser-
vation wage, where we introduce the household head’s earnings and other
non-labor income of the household in order to account for an income ef-
fect on participation in the labor market. When the household head is
a farmer, secondary members may participate in farm work and therefore
 w0i is also assumed to depend on the “individual’s contribution” to farm
proﬁts. We evaluate this contribution while holding ﬁxed other members







+Zhθ +u0h,w h e r eLh+i = Lh and Lh−i = Lh −1i fi
is actually working on the farm in h,a n dLh+i = Lh+1andLh−i = Lh alter-
natively. This means that the labor decision model is hierarchical between
the household head and other household members and is not simultaneous
among other household members, i.e. they do not take into account the
consequences of their activity choice on that of other household members.
Comparing the respective values attributed to the three labor opportuni-
ties, workers allocate their labor force in order to maximize their earnings:13
i chooses family work iﬀ  w0i >w 1i and  w0i >w 2i (6)
i chooses self − employment iﬀ w1i >  w0i and w1i >w 2i (7)
i chooses wage − work iﬀ w2i >  w0i and w2i >w 1i (8)
2.3.2 Econometric identiﬁcation and results
For the econometric identiﬁcation of our “hierarchical and non-simultaneous”
model of labor supply decisions, we assume independence for the unobserv-
13Multi-activity in the sense that an individual carries out two activities, either in a
seasonal rhythm, or by working in each activity part-time, is not considered in our model.
Table A1 (Appendix) shows that multi-activity is not a very important issue, especially
for household members other than the household head, i.e. there is a relatively strong




 t0,t 1,t 2

between individuals and even between members of the
same household. In the case of agricultural households, we also assume that
u0 is independent from

 t0,t 1,t 2

for all household members. Only some el-
ements of the underlying covariance structure between unobservable factors
can be identiﬁed, because observed wages are measured with errors and/or
include a transient component εj (j =1 ,2) which does not enter into la-
bor supply decisions of (risk-neutral) individuals. Finally we assume joint
normality for the vector of unobservables:





Under these assumptions, we can adopt the following estimation strategy.
For non-agricultural households, we estimate by maximum likelihood tech-
niques the occupational choice and earnings model represented by equations
(2)-(4) and the series of selection conditions (6)-(8); we obtain a bivariate
tobit as shown in Magnac (1991). For agricultural households, we follow a
limited information approach: in a ﬁrst step, we estimate the reduced form
farm proﬁt function (5), then derive an estimate for the individual potential
contribution to farm production; in a second step, we estimate the reservation
wage equation (4) by including this latter variable and retaining the wage
functions estimated for non-agricultural households (because of the small
sample of individuals living in agricultural households but working outside).
Maximum likelihood estimation allows for the identiﬁcation of the param-
eters of the wage, self-employment proﬁt and family work value equations:
β1,β 2,β 0. Now, nine variance and correlation parameters can be identiﬁed.14
14ρ = corr (t1 − t0,t 2 − t0), σj =

Var (tj + εj), θj =

Var (tj − t0), λj = corr(tj +
εj,t j − t0), µj = corr(tj + εj,t 2 − t1). Given that only the reservation value function
is diﬀerent between members of agricultural non-agricultural households, two series of
estimates are computed for β0,θ 1, θ2, ρ, λ1, λ2, whereas only one series is computed for
β1,β 2,σ 1,σ 2,µ 1,µ 2.T h e θ1,θ 2 and ρ estimates are also computed in order to respect a
common constraint, Var(t2 − t1)=θ2
1 + θ2
2 − 2ρθ1θ2 which are the same in both cases.
13Table A4 (Appendix) shows the estimation results for non-agricultural
household members including the household head. As expected, the returns
to education are the highest in the wage earner sector with a 17% increase
for each additional year. They are the lowest in the informal sector with
only 7%. The impact of education on the reservation wage lies in-between,
but close to the self-employment coeﬃcient (10%). Returns to experience
are similar in the informal and formal sectors, while the reservation value
follows an ever increasing parabola (remember that children older than twelve
years and enrolled in school are out of the sample). All three values are
higher in towns than in rural areas. Non-Ivorians have, as expected, a lower
reservation value and are discriminated against Ivorians in the wage sector
(or have unobservable worse skills on average). However, this is not the case
in the informal sector. For women, other things being equal, the competitive
potential wage appears as 83% lower than for men. But, given that we
analyze monthly wages this large diﬀerence in the wage rate can be explained
by diﬀerences in the hours worked. Furthermore, imposing a competitive
structure for the labor market leads to an integration of some elements of non-
monetary tastes for jobs or of entry costs in the potential wage equations. The
reservation value for women is 22% lower than for men, but the eﬀect of this
variable should not be interpreted in isolation from the variables describing
the relation to the household head. Indeed female household heads tend
to participate more of their time and more frequently than male household
heads. Among household variables which only inﬂuence the reservation value,
household head’s income for secondary members has the expected positive
sign, although it is only hardly signiﬁcant. The number and age structure
of children has a small and mixed inﬂuence on participation on the labor
market. The number of adult men, but not that of adult women, tends to
14decrease participation.
Table A3 (Appendix) shows the estimated agricultural proﬁt function.
The number of family workers comes out with a coeﬃcient that is consistent
with usual values: a doubling of the work force leads to a roughly 50%
increase of agricultural proﬁts. The amount of arable land also comes out
with a decreasing marginal productivity. Age and sex of the household head
are both signiﬁcant, whereas education of the household did not come out
and was withdrawn from the set of explanatory variables. All regions come
out with a negative sign with respect to the Savannah region (North), which
reﬂects the low relative prices for cocoa and coﬀee in contrast to cotton
(grown in the north) in the period of data collection (1992/93).
Table A4 (Appendix) shows the estimation results for secondary mem-
bers of agricultural households. As noted before, self-employment earnings
and wage functions have been constrained to be the same as those for non-
agricultural households. Not surprisingly, people living in towns tend to
work more often outside the family. This is also the case for women and
immigrants, whatever their relation to the household head. The presence of
children has no eﬀect, while the number of working age men in the household
increases the reservation value of an individual. The above deﬁned potential
individual contribution to the agricultural proﬁt increases the propensity to
work on the farm with a reasonable elasticity of +0.3.
2.3.3 Calibration and simulation procedure
For the simulation exercise, we need to recover the whole covariance struc-
ture Σ∗. Therefore, we proceed to a calibration. We ﬁrst assume that the
measurement error and transient component of wages is low (i.e. ε2 =0 ) .
Second, we assume that the unobservable term of the reservation value is
15not correlated with the measurement error and transient component of self-
employment earnings (i.e. corr(t0,ε 1) = 0). These two assumptions allow
for a straightforward identiﬁcation of the remaining part of the covariance
matrix. With the estimated coeﬃcients, we obtain rather reasonable esti-
mates:
• rather close standard errors for the permanent components of individual
task unobservables, i.e. σ (t1) ≈ σ (t2) ≈ 0.8;
• almost no correlation between the two: corr(t2,t 1) ≈ 0.0;
• positive and reasonably close correlations between these unobservables
and the unobservable in the reservation value, i.e. corr(t1,t 0) ≈
corr(t2,t 0) ≈ 0.5;
• a large measurement error and transient component for self-employment
beneﬁts: σ (ε1)=1 .4 ∗ σ(t1);
• itself being negatively correlated with t1 and notably t2:w h i c hm a y
reﬂect that under-declaration of beneﬁts is more frequent at the top of
the distribution of income.
Once the calibration is done, the weakly competitive occupational choice
and labor income model is ready for simulation. We just have to draw, for
each individual, a vector of unobservables. This vector of unobservables is
constrained to respect the inequality constraints (6)-(8) for individuals who
are at least 11 years old in 1993 and for which the initial occupational choice
is observed. In each period, the relative task prices p1/p0 and p2/p0 should
ideally be determined by the general equilibrium of goods and labor markets,
confronting the aggregate number of eﬃciency units of labor supplied by in-
dividuals to the aggregate demand for each task derived from consumption
16choices and production processes. We leave this for future work and assume
stability of relative prices, i.e. perfect adequacy between the evolution of
labor supply and labor demand. The employment structure and the income
distribution of the economy is then purely supply driven, and depends only
on fertility, mortality, household composition, migration and educational in-
vestment. Some consequences of this modelling choice can easily be foreseen:
as the working age population gets younger and as the average size of house-
holds decreases, work outside the family becomes more frequent. Further-
more, as the average level of education increases, wage work increases more
than self-employment.
Land is of course a key variable in the generation of agricultural income.
We attribute the land in each household to the current household head. If
the household head leaves the household, for marriage for instance, land is
attributed to the new household head. If the ﬁrst-born boy of a household
leaves for marriage, he receives 50% of the household’s land. The land of
households which disappear, due to deaths of all its members, is reallocated
in equal parts within each region among the households without land, such
that the proportions of households owning land remain constant with respect
to 1992/93. At the end of each period the quantity of land is increased for
each household by 3%, which is the approximate natural population growth
rate in the model. This increase can also be interpreted as an increase in
the productivity of land. Households switch to the agricultural sector—i.e.
become an agricultural household—if the land they own exceeds a certain
threshold level L> = ¯ L which we ﬁxed at 0.1 ha, and in the opposite, they
exit the agricultural sector—i.e. become a non-agricultural household—if
land size falls under this threshold, L<¯ L. In the base sample 45.6% of the
households are involved in independent agricultural activity (18.3% urban
17and 81.7% rural) and 54.4% are not (86.9% urban and 13.1% rural).
3 Simulation results
Drawing on the hypotheses summarized in Section 2.2, three demo-economic
simulations are implemented: (i) a no-AIDS scenario (NOAIDS), (ii) an
AIDS scenario in which risks of infection only depend on sex and age (WAIDSU,
for With AIDS Uniform), and (iii) an AIDS scenario in which risks of infection
vary within each sex and age group with education, region of residence, mari-
tal status, position in the household and the size of the household (WAIDSH,
the “H” standing for Heterogenous). As mentioned, each of these three sce-
narios respects the United Nations’ projections for the impact of AIDS on
life expectancy at birth.
3.1 Aggregate results
In this section, we describe the counterfactual impact of AIDS on economic
growth, income inequality, poverty, and some demographic variables.
[please insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 shows that, according to our simulations, AIDS has a more im-
portant impact on the size of the population and the economy than it has on
the level and on the distribution of individual incomes. Demographic growth
decreases by around 0.5 percentage points per year due to AIDS. This es-
timation is consistent with the observed growth of 3.3% p.a. between the
two population censuses of 1988 and 1998. The slowdown of the population
growth means that by the end of 2007, the population of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire is
smaller by around one and a half million people, taking into account not
only the deaths of infected persons, but also the births which will not occur.
18The growth of the number of households remains unchanged. However, the
average size of households is projected to decrease due to AIDS by around
0.45 persons.
Although AIDS kills in particular adults of working age, the dependency
ratio does not increase, but instead decreases, particularly in the WAIDSH
scenario. This eﬀect will be commented in detail in the next section, because
it strongly determines the evolution of the distribution of income.
At a ﬁrst glance, it seems that the economy tends to shrink at approx-
imately the same rate than the population. Therefore growth of income
per capita or income per adult equivalent do not change much. However,
it should be reminded that the model does not introduce any of the factors
which macro-studies have pointed out to inﬂuence per capita growth. First,
an increase of private and public health expenditures may lead to a decrease
of savings and investment and result in a lower demand for domestic goods
and for wage labor. Second, labor productivity of infected people is lower,
and people may become inactive some years before they die. Third, workers
deaths generate turnover costs.
While inequality strongly increases over time, the evolution is roughly the
same in each scenario. The income distribution seems unaﬀected by AIDS,
whatever the equivalence scale used. In consequence, as income per capita
increases with a rate of around 4% p.a., poverty is reduced in the same way
in the three scenarios.
[please insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 recapitulates changes in the employment structure and in school
enrolment rates. Again, the changes over time in the employment structure
are not strongly modiﬁed by the AIDS epidemic. Each of the three scenarios
19preserves the same trend that we forecasted given the supply driven nature
of the occupational choice model. Over the ﬁfteen years period, the inactiv-
ity rate declines by around 4 percentage points, the weight of agricultural
workers declines by 2 percentage points, whereas both the weights of wage
earners and of self-employed workers increase by around 3 percentage points.
The main diﬀerences introduced by the AIDS scenarios lie in an accelerated
decrease of the inactivity rate and a smaller decline of the weight of agricul-
tural workers. These contrasting features are easily explained by the head’s
income eﬀect in non-agricultural households and the labor productivity ef-
fect in agricultural households which inﬂuence labor supply decisions. The
increase of the share of independent farmers stems from automatic replace-
ments of dead household heads. The three scenarios also show no diﬀerences
with respect to school enrolment of children. However, we do not pretend
to have a fully reliable model of school enrolment which would allow to de-
rive the impact of adult deaths on the schooling of children and especially
orphans. As described in the appendix, our model indeed introduces the link
to the household head—which Case, Paxson and Ableidinger (2002) put for-
ward as the main variable—and also to the household size. Like the Case et
al. (2002) model, our enrolment model is however estimated in cross-section
and might be biased as Evans and Miguel (2004) argue. But, the estimates
of these latter authors using panel data for Kenya only reveal a moderate
impact of adult deaths on school enrolment too, mitigating the catastrophic
long-run forecasts drawn by Bell et al. (2003). Furthermore and most im-
portantly, here we do not examine this very long-run impact on growth and
income distribution given that we only examine a period of ﬁfteen years.
203.2 The impact of AIDS on individual welfare
Here we analyze the main behavioral changes implied by the occurrence of an
AIDS death. This will help to understand the intricate phenomena hidden
behind the averages considered in the preceding section. First we describe
the frequency and the proﬁle of AIDS deaths in each AIDS scenario. A ﬁrst
diﬀerence can be pointed out with respect to the propagation of AIDS. One
important feature of the so-called heterogenous epidemic (WAIDSH) is the
introduction of an intra-household correlation between risk factors concerning
AIDS infection. Children under ﬁve years have the risk of their mother. For
20 to 59 years old men and 20 to 49 years old women the mechanism is the
following: when a ﬁrst death occurs in a given household, then everybody
in the household “knows somebody who got AIDS” with probability one,
which, according to our modelling of risk factors, increases the risk factor of
all household members through the “matching component” Y (see Section
2.2). As Table 4 shows, this mechanism generates a higher concentration
of AIDS-deaths. Among individuals present in 1992 and in 2007 about two
thirds have not experienced an AIDS death in one of their households they
lived in (“households of passage”), 19% have experienced an unique AIDS-
death, and the remaining 15% have experienced two or more AIDS deaths.
[please insert Table 4 about here]
Table 5 illustrates the mortality diﬀerentials introduced by AIDS with
respect to education and occupation. Among 15 to 60 years old individuals,
a heterogenous AIDS epidemic (WAIDSH) induces an over-mortality for ed-
ucated groups, which is in contrast with the mortality pattern for an uniform
epidemic (WAIDSU) and with the No-AIDS scenario. As it can be seen in
Table 5, the weight of people having ever attended school among the AIDS-
21related deaths is 15 percentage points higher (in 2007) in the WAIDSH sce-
nario than in the WAIDSU scenario. The distribution of AIDS deaths by
occupation (over the population older than eleven years and not enrolled
in school) reveals a rather diﬀerent picture. Now, the heterogenous AIDS
epidemic kills more often farmers and less often self-employed workers and
inactive people.
[please insert Table 5 about here]
Figure 1 draws the concentration curve of AIDS deaths inside the distri-
bution of income per capita. One can see that in both AIDS scenarios the
epidemic kills more often people in the bottom-half of the income distribu-
tion. For instance, the poorest 50% cumulate 60% of the AIDS-deaths over
the 15 years period. However, the two epidemics seem to be more concen-
trated on the richest of the poor, just above and just under the poverty line,
as the maximum concavity of the concentration curves is reached around the
second quintile of the distribution.15 The heterogenous epidemic is only a
little more regressive than the uniform epidemic, as indicated by the stronger
concavity of the corresponding concentration curve. In sum, AIDS kills more
the poor, but rather the richest of the poor. In the case of the uniform epi-
demic, this eﬀect is principally due to the age distribution of the epidemic:
individuals in the intermediate age groups are over-represented in the “lower-
middle class” of the distribution of income per capita.
[please insert Figure 1 about here]
Having described the diﬀerences in the AIDS deaths proﬁles between the
two scenarios, we now turn to the micro-economic explanation of the aggre-
15If individuals are taken as accounting units and a poverty line of US$1 PPP household
income per capita is assumed, the head count index, P0, is about 0.43 in 2007.
22gate results. A ﬁrst striking feature, which has to be explained, is the evo-
lution of the dependency ratio, which seems to determine strongly income,
inequality and poverty. Recall ﬁrst that dependency ratios are computed as
the number of inactive over the number of active individuals in each house-
hold and that every individual in agricultural households older than eleven
years, out of school, and not active outside the household is treated as family
help. As already noted, each scenario shows a decreasing trend of the depen-
dency ratio over time. Moreover, second order diﬀerences emerge between
the three scenarios, but the two AIDS scenarios come out as lower and higher
bound—the WAIDSU scenario being the most pessimistic and the WAIDSH
scenario the most optimistic.
A number of factors contribute to the decrease of the dependency ratio.
First, AIDS also kills inactive people. They represent around 40% of all AIDS
deaths over the period under study: children as well as students, inactive and
unemployed people in urban areas. The heterogenous epidemic kills slightly
more often inactive people than the uniform epidemic, due to the modelling of
intra-household transmission and due to the correlation of infection risk with
education. Second, the death of a woman in the fertility relevant age group
decreases total fertility of the corresponding household.16 This latter eﬀect is
only partially compensated in our fertility equation, where the decrease of the
number of fertile women in the household has a positive impact on the fertility
of other women. The fall in household fertility is again more pronounced in
the WAIDSH scenario where married women are more aﬀected by AIDS
due to more frequent sexual intercourse. Third, the death of a household
head makes exits from inactivity in urban areas more likely, especially in
the WAIDSH scenario, which kills household heads more often. All these
16The physiological decrease of fertility observed among infected women is even not
taken into account here. See Desgr´ ees du Loˆ u, Mselatti, Yaoet al. (1999).
23factors explain why in AIDS aﬀected households the dependency ratio may
not necessarily increase, or may even decrease. A similar result has been
found by Booysen and Bachmann (2002) for the South-African case. They
state that the dependency ratio in AIDS aﬀected and non-aﬀected households
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Likewise, projections of the dependency ratio for
2010 from the International Program Center at the US Bureau of the Census
do not show any systematic diﬀerences either between the with AIDS and
without AIDS scenarios for nine countries of Southern Africa (see Haacker
2002). This does however not mean that AIDS deaths have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the welfare of households. In Table 6, we look again at the sample
of individuals present in the 1992/93 survey and having survived to 2007.
We then formulate a simple panel regression model which can be written for
each period after 1994 as follows:
yi,t+1 = λyi,t−1 + αadi,t + βodi,t + ui + εi,t+1 (10)
where yi,t stands for the (log) of income per capita, adi,t for the occurrence of
an AIDS death in the relevant household in year t,a n dodi,t for the occurrence
of an other death in the relevant household in year t. We give our preference
to this two lags speciﬁcation because in our model, a death takes two years to
be fully taken into account by the occupational choice model at the household
level.17 Given the presence of an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, this model may be
better estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences. However Table 6 shows that the level
and ﬁrst diﬀerence estimators are consistent.
Having experienced an AIDS death in the relevant household in year t
lowers on average income per capita in t + 1 by roughly 3%. In contrast,
having experienced a death from another cause increases on average income
17I.e. household members make a ﬁrst occupational choice in year t, notwithstanding
the choices of others, but then they may reconsider it in year t +1 , once they observe the
consequences of the decisions of the other members.
24per capita by roughly 1.5%. The diﬀerence between the two “types” of
deaths is principally linked to the diﬀerence in the age-mortality pattern.
AIDS kills more often active workers, while other causes of mortality more
often kill children and older persons, lowering the dependency ratio.
[please insert Table 6 about here]
We can now tell a satisfying story for the aggregate results obtained in
the preceding section. We have seen that AIDS kills more often the richest
of the poor and makes survivors a little poorer in terms of income. In other
words, AIDS kills more often people around the poverty line and pushes some
survivors under the poverty line. The combination of these two elements may
explain why the overall eﬀect of AIDS on income poverty seems ambiguous
when poverty is measured at the individual level. At the household level,
the household formation and income generating process increase again this
ambiguity.
4 Conclusion and policy implications
To our knowledge, this analysis is the ﬁrst attempt to link the distribution
of the AIDS epidemic over an African population and the distribution of
income. It reveals the complexity of the interaction between demographic
behavior and the income generating process.
When one focuses on the labor supply eﬀects of over-mortality, the main
eﬀect of AIDS in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire is a shrinking of the size of the economy
by around 6% after 15 years, leaving average income per capita, income
inequality and income poverty roughly unchanged. In contrast with an often
heard argument, the dependency ratio is not much modiﬁed by the epidemic.
These conclusions do not seem to depend on the degree of heterogeneity and
25clustering of the HIV/AIDS infection over the population, as may be inferred
from the comparison between our two epidemiological scenarios. Of course,
if the impact of incapacity in the years preceding the AIDS deaths was taken
into account or if the prospects of labor demand were signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by AIDS (e.g. through a collapse of investment or organizational problems
in ﬁrms), then both the overall and micro-economic impact of the epidemic
would appear more dramatic.
This study also illustrates that such an epidemic ﬁnally reaches all socio-
economic groups of a society. AIDS mortality hurts only a little more the
lower middle class of the Ivorian population, that is the richest of the poor.
It confronts survivors of an aﬀected household to downward, although mod-
erate, transitions through the distribution of income. However, for the two
epidemiological proﬁles we considered, the epidemic turns out to be rather
evenly distributed over the population. For instance, in contrast with another
often heard idea, AIDS is not so much concentrated in urban areas.18 Even
if in our two scenarios in cities AIDS deaths occur more often than deaths
from other causes, about a half of AIDS deaths hit people originating from
rural areas. This latter proportion is even higher when we look at orphans,
whatever the deﬁnition we consider. For instance, more than 60 percent of
orphans come from rural areas. Furthermore, among the less than 15 years
old children whose biological father and mother are observed in the 1992/93
survey or who are born during the simulation period, 9% loose one of their
parent during the ﬁfteen years period. More generally, 10% of children expe-
rience the death of the household head or of the ﬁrst spouse of the household
18This common view probably comes from the fact that AIDS are more often detected
and reported in urban areas. As in 1995, 3,401 out of 5,380 reported AIDS cases were in
Abidjan (Kon´ e, Silu´ e, Agness-Soumahoro et al. 1998). But the distribution of reported
cases is not consistent with the seroprevalence data from surveillance centers for pregnant
w o m e n( s e es e c t i o n2 . 2 ) .
26head. In the year of their parents deaths more than 35 percent of all orphans
live in a household among the poorest quintile in the distribution of income
per capita.
Our study does not question the fact that the AIDS epidemic represents a
terrible human catastrophe that calls for a more vigorous national and inter-
national mobilization. Concerning the provision of appropriate health care
and treatment, our analysis shows that the great majority of AIDS patients
cannot even aﬀord the cost of care for opportunistic infections (OI) or highly
active anti-retroviral therapies (HAARTs). Bonnel (2001), for instance, esti-
mates the annual medium cost for opportunistic infections care and palliative
treatment at 360US$ (resp. 240US$) (in prices of 2000) for an adult (resp. a
child) in a low-income African country. Taking a 250,000 CFAF benchmark
(prices of 1998, approx. 425US$) as a unitary annual cost for the clinical
management of OI in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, we computed that 60 percent of AIDS
infected individuals lived in a household whose total income per capita was
under that benchmark in the year preceding their death. As Figure 2 clearly
shows, the annual cost of a HAART treatment is out of reach for almost
all infected persons in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, in particular if we choose the higher
bound of 1,000 US$ (at 1998 prices, approx. 589,900 CFAF), which are the
estimated annual costs estimated by the Harvard University.19 Of course
households are not only constrained by their budget, but also by the avail-
ability of health infrastructures and services. In the case of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire,
many studies have shown that much remains to be done to modify the eli-
tist bias of past health policies marked by heavy investment biased toward
Abidjan (see e.g. Brunet-Jailly 2002).
19See “Consensus Statement on antitretroviral treatment for AIDS in poor countries”
establised by the faculty of Harvard University in March 2001.
27[please insert Figure 2 about here]
Appendix
Descriptive statistics and estimation results of the oc-
cupational choice and earnings model
[please insert Tables A1 to A4 about here]
Modelling of fertility, marriage, immigration and school enrolment
Fertility
We use the Ivorian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 1994 (INS 1995a)
to model births. The weighted sample is representative on the national level
and covers 5,935 households, comprising 8,099 women between 15 and 49 years
old. The survey contains questions concerning the socio-demographic structure
of households, fertility, health, education, employment and some assets owned by
households. Fertility is estimated by a reduced form probit equation. The depen-
dant latent variable measures the probability that woman i had a birth the twelve
months preceding the survey. The observed dependant variable is whether the
woman had a birth or not during this period. Among the exogenous variables are
matrimonial status, region of residence, both interacted with age and age squared,
and education. To control for polygamy, we also introduce the number of other
women between 15 and 49 years old in the household. The main characteristics of
the estimated model are, that the birth probability increases with marriage, rural
residence, and age (at a decreasing rate). In contrast, it decreases with education,
the number of other women in the household, and residence in Abidjan. Using the
estimated equation and a Monte Carlo lottery, it is determined if a women gives
birth in a speciﬁc period or not. Monte-Carlo lotteries within a micro-simulation
model consist of assigning to each individual i in the current period a certain prob-
28ability for the occurrence of a given event, e.g. a birth. This probability is drawn
from an uniform law comprised between zero and one. The empirical probability
that a woman experiences a birth during this period is calculated using a formerly
estimated (here econometrically) function, where her individual characteristics en-
ter as arguments. If the randomly drawn number is lower than the empirical
probability, then a birth is simulated. If the number of women is suﬃciently high
the aggregated number of births should be equal or very close to the sum of the
individual empirical probabilities. The sex of a child is coded with a probability
of 48.8% female in the model.
Marriage
Only ﬁrst marriage is modelled. All single men between 18 and 49 years old and
all single women between 13 and 43 years old are considered as at risk to marry.
Those who “search” are selected among them using a Monte Carlo lottery and
marriage rates stratiﬁed by age, sex, and residence (urban, rural) estimated by the
INS (1992) using census data. To arrange marriages, we ﬁrst stock the chosen men
and women for each stratum (Abidjan, other cities, West Forest, East Forest, Sa-
vannah) in a matrix representing the diﬀerent marriage markets. Then each matrix
is sorted by education in descending order. We assume that men chose women. A
parameter 0 <= ρ =1deﬁnes the degree of “assortative mating” (Becker 1991).
If ρ is equal to one, the most educated man chooses the most educated woman in
the corresponding stratum, under the condition that the man is not younger than
the woman, and that the woman does not live in the same household as the man,
otherwise he chooses the second most educated woman and so on. The second
most educated man chooses then the next “available” most educated women and
so on. For ρ =0 .5, 50% of men choose their wife conditioning on education and
50% choose randomly. For ρ =0all men choose randomly. The “homogamous”
29men are selected randomly and independently of their education. However, the
selection process always runs in descending order, with the most educated man
choosing ﬁrst. This modelling is coherent with matching models in the sense that
it is assumed that individuals act in an environment where information is per-
fect. There are no search costs. Matches are inﬂuenced by the conditions on the
marriage markets, i.e. the dispersion of potential spouses and the ratio between
potential spouses and competitors. For the simulations ρ was calibrated at 0.8.
The marriage is concluded by an exchange of identiﬁcation codes. Individuals who
ﬁnd no partner remain single and have a chance to be selected in the next period.
For married couples there are three modes of cohabitation: (i) the couple forms
its own new household, (ii) the couple lives with the parents of the man, and (iii)
the couple lives with the parents of the woman. The probabilities for these three
possibilities are calibrated at 70%, 15%, and 15% respectively. In new households,
the man is coded household head.
Immigration
To model net immigration into Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, we use immigration matrices strati-
ﬁed by age and sex based on the Enquˆ ete Ivoirienne sur les Migrations et l’Urban-
isation of 1993 (EIMU) (INS 1995b). This survey covers 16,125 households (58,378
individuals) and is considered to be representative on the national level. The num-
ber of immigrants is determined in each period by applying the net immigration
rate by age group and sex on the number of resident individuals of the same age
group and sex. The entrants are created by duplicating already resident immi-
grants (only matrimonial status is systematically coded as not married). Then the
immigrant is aﬀected with a probability of 70% to a randomly chosen resident,
but former immigrated, family (of course not that of his/her double) and with a
probability of 30%, he creates its own single household. The aﬀectation to an im-
30migrant family translates the idea of migration networks, particularly important
in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire.
School enrolment
We use the information about current enrolment and enrolment in the previous
year in the EP 1993 and the Enquˆ e t ed eN i v e a ud eV i eof 1998 to estimate transi-
tion rates into and out of schooling. The Enquˆ e t ed eN i v e a ud eV i eof 1998 is very
similar to the EP 1993, but the sample size is smaller by 50%. The models are
estimated separately for boys and girls ﬁve to 25 years old using age, household
composition, Ivorian citizenship, educational level already attained, matrimonial
status, relation to the household head, land owned by the household, region of
residence, and educational attainment of the father and the mother as explicative
variables. The estimated coeﬃcients of the corresponding probit models show that
the probability of school entry depends, as one can expect, strongly on age. It is
higher for children with educated parents (notably for girls), and is smaller for chil-
dren in Non-Ivorian households. Furthermore, the probability of entry is higher
if the child has already acquired some education in the past. The probability
of staying in school depends positively on the educational level already attained,
negatively on marriage and the quantity of land owned by the household, and
is higher in urban areas, especially Abidjan. During the simulation, enrolment
status is updated in each period for all children from ﬁve to 25 years old using
the estimated coeﬃcients and a Monte Carlo lottery. Repetition of classes is very
frequent in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, especially before the entry into junior secondary school.
To account for this phenomenon, we ﬁxed the repetition rates at 20% for the ﬁfth
year of primary school, at 50% for the sixth year of primary school and at 10% for
all other classes.
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Table 1
Estimations and projections of mortality in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire with and without AIDS
Indicator 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15
Infant mortality
with AIDS 0.102 0.094 0.089 0.081 0.072 0.063
without AIDS 0.098 0.086 0.079 0.071 0.064 0.056
census 1988 and 1998 0.097 0.104
Mortality under ﬁve
with AIDS 0.167 0.159 0.152 0.138 0.121 0.104
without AIDS 0.160 0.142 0.128 0.113 0.099 0.085
Life expectancy at birth
with AIDS/Men 49.8 48.6 47.4 47.7 49.5 52.0
without AIDS/Men 51.0 52.8 54.9 57.0 59.0 61.1
census 1988 and 1998 53.6 49.2
with AIDS/Women 52.8 50.8 48.1 48.1 50.1 52.9
without AIDS/Women 54.5 56.7 58.4 60.5 62.5 64.6
census 1988 and 1998 57.2 52.7
Source: World Population Prospects 2000, version February 2001 (United Nations 2001), Populations
census 1988 (INS 1992) and 1998 (INS 2001).
40Table 2
Simulation results in terms of population, growth,
inequality, and poverty
(income in 1000 CFA F 1998–Abidjan, end of each year)
1992 1998 2002 2007 growth p.a.
No. of individuals
NOAIDS 5336 6646 7704 9375 0.038
WAIDSU 5331 6474 7379 8785 0.034
WAIDSH 5334 6493 7375 8739 0.033
No. of households
NOAIDS 929 1168 1384 1716 0.042
WAIDSU 926 1168 1389 1729 0.043
WAIDSH 936 1171 1400 1740 0.042
Cum. no. of AIDS deaths
NOAIDS 0 0 0 0
WAIDSU 1 142 296 544
WAIDSH 2 154 323 576
Mean hh. income
NOAIDS 1238 1461 1595 1725 0.022
WAIDSU 1244 1404 1510 1584 0.016
WAIDSH 1213 1416 1490 1596 0.018
Mean hh. size
NOAIDS 5.742 5.691 5.566 5.466 -0.003
WAIDSU 5.759 5.543 5.315 5.082 -0.008
WAIDSH 5.692 5.583 5.263 5.002 -0.009
Mean hh. income per capita
NOAIDS 252 345 392 442 0.038
WAIDSU 256 335 390 436 0.036
WAIDSH 248 341 407 459 0.042
Mean hh. income per adult equivalenta
NOAIDS 523 651 724 800 0.029
WAIDSU 528 631 706 767 0.025
WAIDSH 512 636 703 781 0.029
Dependency ratio
NOAIDS 1.710 1.486 1.384 1.363 -0.015
WAIDSU 1.721 1.534 1.416 1.371 -0.015
WAIDSH 1.700 1.508 1.338 1.321 -0.017
Gini hh. income (hh.)
NOAIDS 0.573 0.593 0.614 0.633 0.007
WAIDSU 0.568 0.598 0.611 0.636 0.008
WAIDSH 0.577 0.605 0.624 0.643 0.007
Gini hh. income per capita (hh.)
NOAIDS 0.554 0.606 0.621 0.644 0.010
WAIDSU 0.553 0.604 0.611 0.636 0.009
WAIDSH 0.556 0.611 0.642 0.653 0.011
Gini hh. income adult equivalenta (hh.)
NOAIDS 0.536 0.568 0.589 0.612 0.009
WAIDSU 0.533 0.571 0.588 0.618 0.010
WAIDSH 0.540 0.579 0.605 0.626 0.010
P0 US$1 hh. income per capita (hh.)
NOAIDS 0.376 0.36 0.347 0.339 -0.007
WAIDSU 0.373 0.358 0.344 0.345 -0.005
WAIDSH 0.384 0.359 0.343 0.332 -0.010
Notes: a Adult equivalent income, AEY ,i sh e r ec o m p u t e db yt h ef o r m u l aAEY = Y/Se,w h e r eY is
total household income, S household size, and e is an economics of scale parameter to which we assigned
a value 0.5.
Source: Simulations by the authors.
41Table 3
Simulation results in terms of
employment and school enrolment
(employment of pop. > 11 years old,
not enrolled in school)
1992 1998 2002 2007 growth p.a.
Inactive
NOAIDS 0.206 0.192 0.184 0.172 -0.012
WAIDSU 0.204 0.198 0.183 0.161 -0.016
WAIDSH 0.207 0.196 0.177 0.157 -0.018
Wage earner
NOAIDS 0.093 0.109 0.117 0.126 0.020
WAIDSU 0.093 0.111 0.117 0.124 0.019
WAIDSH 0.092 0.107 0.116 0.129 0.023
Non-farm self-employ.
NOAIDS 0.101 0.118 0.129 0.137 0.021
WAIDSU 0.103 0.120 0.128 0.138 0.020
WAIDSH 0.101 0.118 0.130 0.139 0.022
Indep. farmer
NOAIDS 0.184 0.164 0.162 0.172 -0.004
WAIDSU 0.185 0.169 0.170 0.195 0.004
WAIDSH 0.184 0.169 0.174 0.192 0.003
Fam. help on farm
NOAIDS 0.416 0.416 0.408 0.392 -0.004
WAIDSU 0.416 0.402 0.401 0.382 -0.006
WAIDSH 0.416 0.410 0.403 0.382 -0.006
E n r o l .c h i l d r .5t o1 1y e a r so l d
NOAIDS 0.369 0.437 0.497 0.543 0.026
WAIDSU 0.370 0.432 0.489 0.547 0.026
WAIDSH 0.369 0.433 0.493 0.537 0.025
Enrol. childr. 12 to 18 years old
NOAIDS 0.420 0.379 0.367 0.385 -0.006
WAIDSU 0.420 0.376 0.361 0.385 -0.006
WAIDSH 0.420 0.376 0.369 0.388 -0.005
Source: Simulations by the authors.
Table 4
Total number of AIDS deaths
known by individuals in households of passage
(statistics only for individuals present in 1992 and 2007)






> 5 0.000 0.009
Source: Simulations by the authors.
42Table 5
Simulation results in terms of AIDS mortality diﬀerentials
(over-mortality with respect to share in t)
1992 1998 2002 2007
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (population > 14 and < 60 years old)
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–no schooling
WAIDSU 0.675 0.659 0.605 0.623
WAIDSH 0.554 0.545 0.503 0.479
Over-mortality–no schooling
WAIDSU 0.085 0.056 -0.008 0.005
WAIDSH -0.036 -0.055 -0.102 -0.126
Share cum. AIDS deaths–at least some primary schooling
WAIDSU 0.241 0.229 0.283 0.267
WAIDSH 0.247 0.286 0.339 0.362
Over-mortality–at least some primary schooling
WAIDSU -0.073 -0.057 0.005 -0.004
WAIDSH -0.067 -0.005 0.051 0.086
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–at least some secondary schooling
WAIDSU 0.085 0.111 0.112 0.110
WAIDSH 0.199 0.169 0.159 0.159
Over-mortality–at least some secondary schooling
WAIDSU -0.012 0.001 0.003 -0.001
WAIDSH 0.103 0.060 0.051 0.040
BY OCCUPATION (population > 11 years old. not enrolled in school)
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–inactive
WAIDSU 0.206 0.226 0.202 0.193
WAIDSH 0.169 0.154 0.168 0.170
Over-mortality–inactive
WAIDSU 0.002 0.029 0.019 0.031
WAIDSH -0.036 -0.039 -0.007 0.012
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–wage earner
WAIDSU 0.071 0.137 0.154 0.144
WAIDSH 0.137 0.149 0.137 0.136
Over-mortality–wage earner
WAIDSU -0.031 0.027 0.037 0.022
WAIDSH 0.034 0.041 0.021 0.010
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–non-farm self-employ.
WAIDSU 0.108 0.137 0.165 0.154
WAIDSH 0.100 0.102 0.121 0.135
Over-mortality of individ.–non-farm self.-employ.
WAIDSU 0.005 0.018 0.038 0.019
WAIDSH -0.004 -0.014 -0.006 0.000
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–indep. farmer
WAIDSU 0.265 0.173 0.156 0.161
WAIDSH 0.169 0.235 0.218 0.214
Over-mortality of individ.–indep farmer
WAIDSU 0.077 -0.009 -0.028 -0.051
WAIDSH -0.013 0.053 0.026 0.001
Share of cum. AIDS deaths–family help on farm
WAIDSU 0.349 0.328 0.323 0.347
WAIDSH 0.426 0.360 0.357 0.345
Over-mortality of individ.–family help on farm
WAIDSU -0.053 -0.066 -0.066 -0.023
WAIDSH 0.019 -0.041 -0.034 -0.023
Notes: A positive sign of “over-mortality” means that the corresponding group was over-proportionally
aﬀected by AIDS deaths. Source: Simulations by the authors.
43Table 6
Regressions of log household income per capita on having known a death
in the relevant household controlling for log household income per capita in 2007
(estimations only on individuals present in 1992 and 2007)
Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
Income in t + 1 regressed on death in t and income in t − 1
WAIDSU (50245 obs.)
AIDS death -0.035 ∗ 0.006
other death 0.027 ∗ 0.004
WAIDSH (50111 obs.)
AIDS death -0.052 ∗ 0.006
other death 0.033 ∗ 0.004
Diﬀ. in inc. betw. t +1a n dt − 1r e g r e s s e do nd i ﬀ .i ni n c .b e t w .t − 1a n dt − 3
WAIDSU (49803 obs.)
AIDS death -0.029 ∗ 0.005
other death 0.014 ∗ 0.003
WAIDSH (49696 obs.)
AIDS death -0.029 ∗ 0.005
other death 0.014 ∗ 0.003
Source: Simulations by the authors.
44Table A1
Description of the sample used for parameter estimation
Non-agricultural hh. Agricultural hh.
HH head Other memb. HH head Other memb.
Age structure
12-24 0.030 0.473 0.027 0.479
25-34 0.258 0.300 0.172 0.207
35-44 0.350 0.139 0.203 0.131
45 and older 0.362 0.088 0.599 0.184
Years of schooling (mean) 4.086 2.789 1.099 1.284
Female (=1) 0.171 0.786 0.121 0.716
Non-Ivorian (=1) 0.361 0.287 0.167 0.178





Abidjan 0.316 0.349 0.005 0.007
Other urban 0.553 0.550 0.176 0.202
East Forest 0.060 0.048 0.250 0.263
West Forest 0.030 0.027 0.253 0.224
Savannah 0.042 0.027 0.316 0.304
Occupation (main activity)a
Inactive/Family helpb 0.142 0.681 0.918
Wage earner 0.484 0.100 0.019
Non-farm self-employ. 0.374 0.219 0.063
Self-employed in agricult. 1.000
More than one activity dur. year 0.128 0.009 0.129 0.011
HH memb. involv. in farm (mean) 3.160
Land available
No land 0.007
Land: from 0 to 1 ha 0.162
Land: from 1 to 2 ha 0.196
Land: from 2 to 5 ha 0.308
Land: from 5 to 10 ha 0.199
Land: more than 10 ha 0.127
Notes: a For agricultural households we coded systematically the household head as head of the farm,
which is in 94.4% of the agricultural households indeed the case.
b The inactive population does not include enrolled children or individuals in professional trainee pro-
grams. Source: EP 1992/93; computations by the authors.
45Table A2
Mean earnings in the sample used for parameter estimation
Non-cens. obs. Cens. obs.a Arithm. meanb S.D.
NON-AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS
Household head
log monthly wage 2 507 8 11.500 1.025
log monthly non-farm proﬁt 1 940 4 10.911 1.115
Other household members
log monthly wage 377 539 11.229 1.104
log monthly non-farm proﬁt 1 452 558 10.185 1.023
AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS
Household head
log yearly agricultural proﬁt 4 204 13.144 1.002
Other household members
log monthly wage 48 138 10.252 1.306
log monthly non-farm proﬁt 377 243 9.868 1.129
Notes: a In the EP 1992/93 individual earnings from dependent wage work and non-farm self-employment
were only collected from the ﬁrst and second decision maker in the household. The estimations take this
into account. During the simulations, we imputed earnings for the other active household members, by
using the estimated equations and by drawing residuals according to the estimated residual variance. Fur-
thermore, we dropped 153 households from the sample because of implausible high or missing agricultural
proﬁts. For individuals occupying several activities, we aggregated all earnings and attributed them to
the main activity.
b Earnings are in 1998 CFA F-Abidjan.
Source: EP 1992/93; computations by the authors.
46Table A3
Agriculture proﬁt function for household head
Dependent variable
log proﬁt last 12 month Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
Log of no. of household members
involved in farm work 0.531 ∗ (0.026)
Land: no land or less than 1 ha (Ref.)
Land: from 1 to 2 ha 0.349 ∗ (0.043)
Land: from 2 to 5 ha 0.553 ∗ (0.042)
L a n d :f r o m5t o1 0h a 0 . 8 9 7∗ (0.047)
Land: more than 10 ha 0.964 ∗ (0.052)
Experience 0.012 ∗ (0.004)
Experience2/100 -0.022 ∗ (0.005)
Woman head of household -0.136 ∗ (0.042)
Savannah (Ref.)
Urban -0.554 ∗ (0.038)
East Forest -0.329 ∗ (0.035)
West Forest -0.230 ∗ (0.035)
Intercept 12.304 ∗ (0.089)
No. of observations 42 0 4
Adj. R2 0.319
Notes: ∗ coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Source: EP 1992/93; estimations by the authors.
47Table A4
Occupational choice and labor income
Bivariate Tobit Model
Dependent variables Non-farm self. Wage earner Reserv. w.
log monthly earnings and occup. choice Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err. Coeﬀ. Std. Err.
NON-AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS (all household members 12 years and older)
Schooling 0.069 ∗ (0.004) 0.171 ∗ (0.004) 0.101 ∗ (0.005)
Experience 0.078 ∗ (0.005) 0.080 ∗ (0.005) -0.011 ∗ (0.006)
Experience2/100 -0.074 ∗ (0.007) -0.094 ∗ (0.008) 0.059 ∗ (0.008)
Abidjan 0.348 ∗ (0.047) 0.529 ∗ (0.042) 0.358 ∗ (0.056)
Other urban 0.300 ∗ (0.043) 0.257 ∗ (0.038) 0.100 ∗ (0.052)
Woman 0.042 (0.038) -0.830 ∗ (0.035) -0.217 ∗ (0.045)
Non-Ivorian -0.030 (0.032) -0.261 ∗ (0.030) -0.215 ∗ (0.036)
# childr. 0-1 years old in hh. 0.038 (0.024)
# childr. 1-3 y. old in hh. -0.018 (0.018)
# childr. 3-9 y. old in hh. -0.035 ∗ (0.017)
# childr. 9-12 y. old in hh. 0.028 ∗ (0.013)
#m e n> 11 y. old in hh.a 0.026 ∗ (0.007)
#w o m e n> 11 y. old in hh.a -0.002 (0.007)
Household head -1.177 ∗ (0.040)
Spouse of h. head. -0.168 ∗ (0.033)
Child of h. head. 0.189 ∗ (0.036)
Other hh. Member (Ref.)
Income of h. head./1000000 0.009 (0.006)
Intercept 8.472 ∗ (0.109) 8.600 ∗ (0.100) 10.586 ∗ (0.115)
σ1, σ2 1.210 ∗ (0.018) 0.799 ∗ (0.014)
λ1 = ρ(u1,v), λ2 = ρ(u2,u) -0.185 ∗ (0.035) 0.416 ∗ (0.043)
µ1 = ρ(u1,u− v), µ2 = ρ(u2,u− v) -0.557 ∗ (0.027) 0.561 ∗ (0.043)
θ1, θ2 1.000 (—–) 1.000 (—–)
ρ = ρ(u,v)0 ( — – )
No. of obs. 14 369
Mean log-lik. -6.116
AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS (secondary household members 12 years and older)
Schooling 0.069 (—–) 0.171 (—–) 0.026 (0.020)
Experience 0.078 (—–) 0.080 (—–) -0.005 (0.016)
Experience2/100 -0.074 (—–) -0.094 (—–) 0.033 (0.022)
Abidjan 0.348 (—–) 0.529 (—–) -0.241 (0.259)
Other urban 0.300 (—–) 0.257 (—–) -0.576 ∗ (0.155)
Woman 0.042 (—–) -0.830 (—–) -0.764 ∗ (0.108)
Non-Ivorian -0.030 (—–) -0.261 (—–) -0.513 ∗ (0.095)
# childr. 0-1 years old in hh. 0.067 (0.056)
# childr. 1-3 y. old in hh. -0.050 (0.040)
# childr. 3-9 y. old in hh. -0.003 (0.047)
# childr. 9-12 y. old in hh. 0.036 (0.037)
#m e n> 11 y. old in hh.a 0.056 ∗ (0.022)
#w o m e n> 11 y. old in hh.a -0.018 (0.018)
Spouse of h. head. -0.002 (0.074)
Child of h. head. 0.022 (0.077)
Other hh. Member (Ref.)
ln∆Π0i 0.316 ∗ (0.095)
Intercept 8.472 (—–) 8.600 (—–) 9.095 ∗ (0.905)
σ1, σ2 1.210 (—–) 0.799 (—–)
λ1 = ρ(u1,v), λ2 = ρ(u2,u) -0.242 ∗ (0.031) 0.050 (0.051)
µ1 = ρ(u1,u− v), µ2 = ρ(u2,u− v) -0.557 (—–) 0.561 (—–)
θ1, θ2 1.372 ∗ (0.195) 1.389 ∗ (0.216)
No. of observations 9 884
Mean log-lik. -0.775
Notes: ∗ coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5% level. a without accounting for the individual itself.
Source: EP 1992/93; estimations by the authors. 48  50
Figures 
Figure 1 
AIDS deaths concentration curve 




Notes: Figure based on households existing in 1993 and 2007. The cumulative AIDS deaths 
include all AIDS deaths, which have occurred between 1993 and 2007. 
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Source: Simulations by the authors. 